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Dualism is rejected on the ground that its ethical correlates are an unsolvable antagonism of good and bad, animal and spiritual, principles in man's life, whose logical outcome is ascetism, and an assumption of an arbitrary struggle of external forces. Materialism is welcomed in so far as it represents a movement toward unity; but is criticized on the ground that it attempts to define existence apart from existence-for-consciousness, which is impossible. Moreover, it is contended that science itself in its apparently most materialistic conquest, physiological psychology, really transcends materialism. "Matter has drawn very close to consciousness. Here, in the consciousness which brain makes possible, is the explanation of matter, the reason for matter, and the reason in matter" (p. 72).

It is impossible to summarize the idealistic Monism set forth by Professor Benedict, because the account is itself but the summary appropriate to a syllabus. It is in line with certain recent renditions of Hegel, notably Bradley's and Royce's, but is truer to Hegel, in the reviewer's mind, as well as more satisfactory in itself, in laying greater stress upon the *positive* significance of conflict and the suffering that attends it, in the constitution of an active and worthful universe, instead of tending to give a negative interpretation of conflict as due to the "finite" over against the complete, or to "appearance" over against Reality. It is to be hoped that Professor Benedict will give in ample form what he has set forth here in outline. Especially noteworthy is the temper in which Professor Benedict holds to the irrationality of a demand for finality—for absolute explanation—upon one side, while, upon the other, he insists upon the moral duty of adopting as a hypothesis that world-view which, all things taken into account, seems to serve relatively best the purpose of rationalizing existence and life.

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SCOTTISH PHILOSOPHY IN ITS NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. By Henry Laurie, LL. D., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy in the University of Melbourne. Glasgow: James Maclehose & Sons. 1903. Pp. viii, 344.

Professor Laurie has done both a real and a needed service to the history of philosophical thought by the publication of

this work. The full meaning and significance of Scottish Philosophy are becoming always more obscured by the German speculations and more recent theories which absorb the attention of the philosophical student to-day. The Scottish philosophy is to us a thing of the past, but it deserves to be studied, not only for its place in the history of philosophy, but because of the impulses it gave to modern thought in the case of men like Hume, Reid, Hamilton, and Ferrier. The excellence of Professor Laurie's work lies in this, that while doing sympathetic justice to the Scottish Philosophy of the past, he is yet in no sense impervious to the broader, fuller light of the philosophical to-day. In a word, his work is extremely well done, and no points of detailed criticism I may make are meant in the least to detract from the abundant credit I give to his work for freshness, acuteness, interest, and discriminating power. And the worst of that criticism shall come first. The book leads up, in its final issue, to a chapter on "recent developments," which I cannot accept as very complete or satisfying. Rightly enough, it makes due note of the "more universal character" of philosophy, as studied in Scotland to-day, in consequence of the mingling with "the fuller tide of European thought." The chapter is all right so far as it goes, but it does not go very far. No mention is made, for example, among these "recent developments" of the enormous amount of idealistic teaching that has taken place under the Gifford Lectures foundation—as by Prof. Wallace, Principal Caird, and Prof. E. Caird at Glasgow, Prof. E. Caird and the Rt. Hon. R. B. Haldane at St. Andrews, and Prof. Ward and Prof. Royce at Aberdeen. In a "national" development, one must not write as though Edinburgh were Scotland; nor must the lectures or books of resident professors be the only thing taken into account, far less potent in some instances than other agencies or influences. It seems to me strange that Prof. Laurie has not discussed the relation of these and like idealisms to the realistic philosophy of McCosh and the Scottish thinkers—a relation more interesting and suggestive than is here brought out under "recent developments."

Professor Laurie's historical chapters on individual thinkers are excellent, and make interesting reading. After a brief but careful Introduction, he begins with an account of Francis Hutcheson, of "moral sense" fame. Dr. Laurie says "the importance of his influence on later thought is not to be denied

Scottish philosophy inherited its psychological method from Hutcheson and his teachers. While outwardly attached to the empiricism of Locke, his affirmation of perceptions of beauty and virtue as ultimate and original was at least a premonition of the inquiry into first principles which was afterwards characteristic of the Scottish School." Passing over Andrew Baxter, we come to David Hume, "a thinker of the first importance who has left his mark, directly or indirectly, on all subsequent speculation." Professor Laurie's account of Hume is tolerably full and lengthy, and it is also very clear and careful, although I should not like to pronounce it the clearest statement or criticism of Hume's positions I have read in recent times. But it shows, beyond doubt—as indeed these chapters generally show—a painstaking and enlightened grasp of themes which he has carefully studied at first hand, and this is much. As I am writing in an ethical journal, I quote his words as to Hume's ethical position: "The value of Hume's ethical philosophy lies, not in its positive conclusions, but in its connection with the empiricism which preceded it, and in the light which it throws on later theories of Utilitarianism. He who can discern the limitations of an empirical philosophy, and the consequent failure of the solutions offered by the clear-sighted and clearly speaking Hume, will have little difficulty in penetrating the confusion of similar theories in more recent years." Passing Lord Kames, we come next to the chapter on Adam Smith, which, of course, dwells rather on his "Theory of Moral Sentiments" than on his "Wealth of Nations." Dr. Laurie notes the indebtedness of Smith, in working out his ingenious attempt to resolve morality into sympathy, to Hutcheson and Hume. Sympathy is described as an original principle of human nature, and a distinction is drawn between praise and praiseworthiness. But, as Dr. Laurie shows in working out the subject, we are forced beyond those facts of sympathetic feeling on which Smith professes to found his theory of morals. Nor has he, again, been able to show how sympathy of any kind can be "metamorphosed into a conviction of duty." The truth is, he has had to assume the imperative claims of duty, and, so doing, has had to go far beyond the facts of sympathetic feeling. But this "absent-minded scholar shows a wide and subtle knowledge of human nature, and never was a moralist more free from platitudes."

This brings us to Thomas Reid, the founder of what is commonly called the Scottish School of Philosophy. His was the

so-called philosophy of common sense. For Reid, holding reason and common sense to have one author, made it his business to reconcile them. His stress lay on the instinctive beliefs of men, since to him philosophy could only be founded upon these. Professor Laurie well describes how he opposed a philosophy of faith to the philosophy of scepticism, and insisted on the need of trusting certain first principles of human belief as ultimate. And Professor Laurie is right in describing Reid's philosophy as "the incongruous result of two methods of inquiry,—one, an appeal to common conviction; the other, the method of critical analysis. The first is unphilosophical and erroneous, since the truth which our beliefs contain can be tested only by submitting them to reflective thought; and in so far as he adopted the second method, he was only following in the footsteps of the philosophers who had preceded him, for this was the method of Descartes, of Locke, and of Berkeley."

Dr. Laurie discusses Reid's analysis of the facts of perception, and shows both how little original it was, and how far he had wandered from the unreflective thought he set out to conserve, in his ambiguous representations. Professor Laurie yet shows, at close of the chapter, the advance marked by Reid's philosophy, spite of its imperfections, as seen in the immediate effect it had on its own country, and in the preparation for Kant's deeper analysis, by its assertion of necessary truths. He rightly notes, also, what a powerful instrument it became in France, against prevailing sensualistic and materialistic philosophy, in the hands of Royer-Collard, Jouffroy, and Cousin. It is interesting, also, to be reminded of what Professor Sidgwick wrote so late as 1895, in *Mind*, that the student "may even now find profit in communing with the earnest, patient, lucid, and discerning intellect of the thinker who, in the history of modern speculation, has connected the name of Scotland with the Philosophy of Common Sense." And Dr. Laurie significantly adds, that "no one who has read the "Methods of Ethics" can have failed to notice the value attached by its author to common-sense beliefs as starting points for practice and for speculative investigation." Reid was, after all, no small thinker.

But space limits forbid my going into detail with every thinker. Lord Monboddo, Adam Ferguson, Dugald Stewart, Thomas Brown, Thomas Chalmers, Sir William Hamilton, and James Frederick Ferrier, all have their interest and place well set forth by Professor Laurie. The chapter on Ferrier—whose

merits have lain too long unrecognized—is very interesting and welcome, as bringing into more general notice his significance for modern speculation. With this book of Professor Laurie in the one hand, and that by Professor Pringle Pattison on "Scottish Philosophy," with its fine comparison of the Scottish and German answers to Hume, in the other, the student will not fail to know what is most important for him to know of this interesting phase of philosophy.

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JAMES LINDSAY.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY, with Other Lectures and Essays. By Robert Adamson, M. A., LL. D. Sometime Professor of Logic and Rhetoric in the University of Glasgow. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood & Sons, 1903. In two Volumes. Pp. xlviii, 358, and xv, 330.

These volumes are edited by Prof. Sorley, who has prefixed to them an interesting and sympathetic memoir. The whole of the first volume is occupied with the lectures on the Development of Modern Philosophy, which are reproduced from the notes of students. The lectures on Kant formed part of a separate course, and are on a considerably larger scale than those on the Philosophers who precede and follow him. The historical lectures are followed by others entitled "Suggestions towards a theory of Knowledge based on the Kantian." The views put forward here are of great interest, but any attempt to give an account of them would take this notice more deeply into Epistemology than would be suitable for a Journal of Ethics.

The latter half of the second volume is occupied by a course of lectures on the "Principles of Psychology," any detailed notice of which would also be beyond the sphere of this paper. There remain the seven Essays and Addresses with which the second volume commences. These are, an Inaugural Address in the University of Glasgow, a lecture on Giordano Bruno, another on Psychology and Epistemology, an early fragment on Kant's view of Psychology, and addresses to popular audiences on Philosophy and the Social Problem, the Basis of Morality, and the Regeneration of Germany.

The address on Philosophy and the Social Problem contains some valuable criticism of the ideas of Organism and Development as applied to society. Of the first, Dr. Adamson says,